

ANALYSIS OF SOURCES RELATED TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE ZARAFSHAN DISTRICT

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ABSTRACT

Describing the first decade of the 21st century on the pages of history, humanity draws conclusions from the experience of previous eras. In particular, the results of two world wars in the 20th century were such that such terrible events as invasion of other countries were prohibited in the world. That is why the study of the history of colonial authoritarian regimes that lasted until the beginning of the 19th and 20th centuries is of great scientific importance for obtaining important historical and social conclusions. The history of the Turkestan region in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries is a period associated with the establishment of an autocratic system of governance in the country. The content of this article is devoted to the analysis of information about events related to the history of the Samarkand region after the conquest of our country by the Russian Empire.

According to historical sources, the Russian Empire carried out its plan to conquer Turkestan taking into account the situation in international relations. In 1865-1866, after the conquest of lands belonging to the Tashkent and Jizzakh regions, the Turkestan General Government was created on July 14, 1867, consisting of the Ettisuv and Syrdarya regions. On April 30, 1868, the imperial troops marched towards the city of Samarkand, consisting of 4,019 soldiers. (1.70) In the former Soviet era, historians were influenced by communist ideology and tried to evaluate the conquest campaigns of the Russian Empire. positively. For example: they put forward the opinion that Samarkand surrendered to von Kaufmann without any resistance, and even cited as an example the telegram of the Governor-General to the Russian Emperor. Apparently, Samarkand, the ancient Muslim center, was taken without a shot being fired (2.75).

In honor of independence, Uzbek historians, based on sources, have shed enough light on this issue, and this process is being studied more widely. Extremely valuable information is provided by the famous scientist Hamid Ziyoyev based on materials from the "F-715" fund of the Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Colonel Serebrennikov A.G. According to the order of Kuropatkin, the Minister of War of the Russian Empire, "Turkestan region. Collects information for the collection "Collection of materials for the history of its conquest." There are many collected documents, among which it is recognized that "the number of defenders of the Motherland defending on Choponot Hill consists of 12,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 1,500 artillerymen, a total of 100,000 people. (3.261) Thus, the defenders of Samakand, who had sufficient opportunities for resistance, even according to officially confirmed information, had a significant advantage over the Russian troops and were located on the strategically located Chopon-ota hill.

The absence of a clear plan of action between the troops of the Bukhara Emirate and the defenders of Samarkand, the presence of modern weapons for that time, especially artillery capabilities, as in the case of the Russian Empire, von Kaufmann's troops captured Samarkand. The administrators of the Russian Empire included in the Turkestan General Government the lands of the conquered Samarkand region up to the present Mirbazar (Narpai district). The

“temporary provision” regarding this came into force at the beginning of June 1868. According to it, the Zarafshan region formed a territorial unit consisting of two divisions, Samarkand and Kattakorgan. The Samarkand department of the Zarafshan district consisted of a district that included 11 settlements, and the Katta-Kurgan department consisted of 1 district, uniting 16 villages. It can be assumed that the issue of the creation and formation of the Zarafshan region originates from the relations of the empire with the Bukhara Emirate in the modern period.

Because the views of the Russian military on the need for the immediate occupation of the Bukhara Emirate were not realized. In this regard, it is very appropriate to cite some opinions of historians of that time. According to the Soviet historian N.A. Khalfin, author of the monograph “The Accession of Central Asia to Russia,” this was a manifestation of two different paths on the issue of Central Asia (1.283). This situation in Russia's Central Asian policy undoubtedly prevented the tsarist government from approving the peace treaty concluded in 1868 between the Governor-General of Turkestan and the Khanate of Bukhara, and the problem in Russia's policy in Central Asia remained unresolved. The “Samarkand issue”, which became the subject of a dispute between state courts for several years. The “Samarkand question” is undoubtedly connected with the plan to strengthen the vassalage established over the Bukhara Khanate, and the political situation that arose between the ruling circles of the tsarist autocracy during its solution revealed the true essence of Russia's policy towards the Bukhara Khanate. The Bukhara Khanate, especially it, openly demonstrates the intention of the Turkestan administration to preserve the Samarkand oasis with its own hands.

Although the Russian Ministry of Defense supports the administration of Turkestan in the “Samarkand issue” and is trying to help it in every possible way, but at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, addressed to the Governor-General of Turkestan K.P. Kaufman, the Samarkand oasis will be returned to Bukhara, and the border of the Zarafshan River will be forced to send successive orders about transferred from the right bank. On June 4, twenty days before the signing of the peace treaty with Bukhara, Russian Defense Minister D. A. Milyutin sent a telegram to the Governor-General of Turkestan K. P. Kaufman, ordering him to stop further offensive and transfer military forces to the right bank of the Zarafshan River - Jizzakh offers return to your borders.

Russian-Bukhara relations were even discussed at a special council of heads of military and foreign affairs held with the participation of Alexander II, where it was decided to “strictly adhere to the previous program” and not occupy new lands. D. A. Milyutin, in a letter to K. P. Kaufman regarding the decision of the meeting, reports that the Russian border with Bukhara should pass east of Samarkand and this city should remain outside the lands under the control of the Russian Empire. But in his letter, he talks about ensuring by any means possible the establishment of Russian political domination over Bukhara. After Alexander II approved the decision to return the cities of Samarkand and Kattakurgan to Bukhara by postponing the deadline for approving the peace treaty concluded between the Turkestan province and the Bukhara Khanate, D.A. Milyutin sent K.P. Kaufman 1868 on July 13 another special letter in which he ordered the evacuation of the conquered areas, including the city of Samarkand.

On August 2 of this year, addressed to K. P. Kaufman and August 13, addressed to the Chief of the General Staff F. L. Heiden, a written order sent from St. Petersburg to the Turkestan governor increased the size of the indemnity to Bukhara. up to one million soums with the

condition of its payment within four years. The Emir is asked to return the occupied regions (5,283). The Turkestan governor-general and the military command surrounding him, proud of their established political position in Central Asia, do not pay attention to constant orders from the center, much less return the conquered areas to the khanate, but this is possible. to maintain Russian dominance in the Zarafshan district and tried to expand its borders. That is why, in negotiations with St. Petersburg, K. P. Kaufman is trying to prove the correctness of his opinion and his actions on the "Samarkand issue" and not to lose the upper part of the Zerafshan Valley.

Alexander II accepts K.P. Kaufman's proposal to slightly extend the period for the return of Samarkand to the Bukhara Khanate, and he was ordered to write down and transmit to the government his comments on the further policy of the Bukhara Khanate. However, such a policy pursued by the administration of Turkestan in Central Asia increases anxiety in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Asia Department and puts their leaders in danger. According to M. A. Terentyev and M. I. Venyukov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and State Chancellor A. M. Gorchakov and the head of the Asian Department N. P. Stremoukhov were alarmed by the opinion that England should not have been provoked against Russia (5.423).

In August 1868, the city of Penjikent "voluntarily surrendered" (6.154), after its annexation to the Zeravshan district, and in October of this year, the uprising led by the emir's eldest son Abdul Malik for A.K. was suppressed. Abramov, as a result of the entry of Russian troops into the city of Karshi (7.91), the discussion between state courts and their supporters, following two different paths on the "Samarkand issue," has intensified, it is becoming serious. A.M. GoRchakov and N.P. Stremukhov, dissatisfied with any military campaigns aimed at expanding Russia's borders, insisted on returning the Zerafshan Valley to Bukhara. They will be supported by expert on "Asian issues" N.V. Khanikov.

N.V. Khanikov explains the need to abandon the policy of aggression pursued in Samarkand and in Central Asia as a whole. In his opinion, such a policy "will pull Russia back into the whirlpool of interference in the internal affairs of the small khanates of Central Asia." Although no action is being taken to return the Zarafshan district to the Khanate, the Emperor of Russia still agrees with the opinion of N.V. Khanikov. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will try with all its might to return the Zarafshan district to Bukhara, setting up the central government against the arbitrariness of the Turkestan administration and increasing all-round pressure. This attitude of the Foreign Ministry towards the "Samarkand issue" caused discontent among supporters of the tsar's autocratic colonial policy and the Russian bourgeoisie interested in its implementation.

In an editorial published in the 5th issue of the journal "Bulletin of Europe" for 1869, the discussion of the "question of the return of Samarkand" is recognized as inappropriate and is sharply criticized. Noting that such indecisiveness is especially dangerous at a time when there is a dispute between England and Russia about defining the boundaries of their spheres of influence in Central Asia, the editors of the magazine recommend abandoning the "later acquired" areas in Turkestan. .warns against accepting any obligations on the part of the state (10.378). Thus, the Russian bourgeoisie was not only a simple supporter of the active path pursued by the administration of Turkestan in the "Samarkand issue", but also served as support for it through the press.

There is also the fact that some Russian orientalists, including V.V. Radlov, who were in Central Asia at that time and served in the administration of Turkestan, in order to use the favorable conditions here for scientific purposes, studied the natural conditions of the Zarafshan district and the socio-economic conditions of its population. Although he approached the “Samarkand issue” as a supporter of leaving the valley untouched, without dividing it into two parts, this issue was resolved by returning the Samarkand oasis to the Khanate or annexing the Bukhara oasis, and the complete capture of the Zeravshan valley presupposes a decisive decision. From the point of view of irrigation, the Zeravshan Valley is an integral part. Considering the condition of this land and other aspects, it should be completely occupied or left completely untouched.

By occupying part of it, we take control of the inhabitants who are in close contact with the rest, and in the unconquered part we leave space where it is easy to make plans against us. Our enemies, not brought under any control by us, will be able to constantly excite the population under our control. In this regard, Muslim priests can always have success among the religious population" (11.15). Although the Russian orientalist V.V. Radlov wrote in his work about the non-conquest of the Zeravshan Valley, he interpreted the “Samarkand question” primarily as a representative of the bourgeois class and as a means of strengthening the political positions of the tsarist autocracy in Central Asia. expansion must continue. By this, he supports the opinion of the Russian bourgeoisie on the “Samarkand issue” that there is no need to give away areas that can be “acquired further.” As a result of his delicate policy, given his relations with England, Zarafon received the status of a special district. The Zarafshan district became the cause of disputes between various administrative departments of the empire.

As a result, only in 1873, more precisely, after the issue of the Khiva Khanate was resolved, the Zarafshan district was included in the Russian Empire. The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries of Samarkand is associated with the establishment of the power of the Governor-General of Turkestan, and the history of the Zarafshan district from 1868 to 1886 deserves special attention. Rchakov and N.P. Stremukhov, dissatisfied with any military campaigns aimed at expanding Russia's borders, insisted on returning the Zeravshan Valley to Bukhara. They will be supported by expert on “Asian issues” N.V. Khanikov.

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