

## LAST REPRESENTATIVE POLICY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN UZBEKISTAN

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### ABSTRACT

In this article, based on scientific literature literature on repressive policy in Uzbekistan. Analyzed the activities of employees of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the USSR in Uzbekistan which is referred to as "cotton case", later began a new round of repression.

**Keywords:** "cotton case", the Communist Party repression, national rebirth, stagnation, restructuring.

On February 3-5, 1981, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR was held. According to its results, Sh. Rashidov was elected first secretary, L. Grekov - second secretary, N. Khudayberdiyev - chairman of the Council of Ministers, I. Usmankhuzhaev - chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, A. Khudayev - secretary of the Central Committee, M. Musakhanov - first secretary of the Tashkent Communist Party region, L. Melkumov - Chairman of the State Security Service, Y. Maksimov - Commandant of the Turkestan Military District, I. Anisimkin - Secretary of the Central Committee, A. Salimov - Secretary of the Central Committee, E. Aitmuratov - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Central Committee of the Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, N. Makhmudova, U. Umarov member of the Bureau of the Central Committee.

As recorded in the documents of the congress dated February 3-5, the volume of national income amounted to 15 billion 857 million 600 thousand rubles, next year it increased by 6.6%, the volume of gross national product increased by 6.4% [1,p.195].

The leaders of all the republics of the union were dependent on the CPSU and other central government organizations. Whatever path the center chooses, all the republics should also follow the same path. National properties and characteristics were not given enough attention. However, despite this, in the early 70s, Sh. Rashidov several times raised the question of reducing the cotton harvest plan to the center, since there were not enough resources to provide the center with the required amount of raw cotton. Naturally, in this situation, additions to the harvest are possible. However, the center argued that they export cotton abroad and they have the opportunity to receive foreign currency, and rejected Sh. Rashidov's proposal. In addition, in order to further continue the arms race between the USSR and the USA, there was a need to obtain foreign currency through raw cotton and its export. There was also a strong need for goods for the army, produced in large quantities from their raw cotton. If Sh. Rashidov not only did not comply with the instructions of the center, but also allowed a smaller amount of cotton harvest than indicated in the plan, he could be dismissed from his position.

In 1966, Uzbekistan exceeded the mark for raw cotton procurement of 4 million tons. In 1974, the limit of 5 million tons was exceeded. And in 1978, 5.5 million tons of cotton were harvested. Of course, this is an unimaginable level of growth. Such a dramatic leap would have been impossible to achieve without postscripts. Of course, during the reign of L.I. Brezhnev they looked at this with closed eyes: firstly, the USSR record for cotton harvest was set; secondly, it

instills hatred of bureaucracy [2,p.243]. When L.I. Brezhnev was at the head of the party, corruption in Uzbekistan was no higher than in other republics of the union. For comparison, we can cite Armenia. In 1979, film director A. Mkrtchyan at the Kiev Film Festival assessed corruption in Armenia as follows: "Corruption is a cancer that interferes with life. It is necessary to fight against the corruption that has taken over the entire country, however, we probably will not get any results from this... A new class of bribe-takers, obvious gangsters, has emerged. Rich businessmen insult the intelligentsia: they give 20 thousand so that we can tell them a story, make them laugh, or sing a song. Only they can live well." It is difficult to breathe in conditions of complete corruption. There are trials going on - someone is sent to prison, and his place is quickly taken by another [3,p.246].

However, despite this, the chief secretary of the CPSU decided to fight corruption and began with Uzbekistan. Of course, there were reasons for this. He wanted to remove all the leaders who were close to L.I. Brezhnev. Instead of them, he began to appoint his own people (in particular, he appointed the 1st Secretary of the Tomsk Regional Committee E.K. Ligachev responsible for the selection and appointment of personnel; he was being trained for the position of head of the external department and the personnel department of the CPSU Central Committee). Yu.V. Andropov considered Sh.R. Rashidov also a person close to Brezhnev. There were a large number of representatives of Caucasian nationality in high positions in the CPSU, the Council of Ministers and other government bodies. Ukrainians and Belarusians enjoyed the same spiritual and political privileges as Russians. The leaders of the Baltic republics were inclined towards separatists, so it was dangerous to start the fight from these countries. And the leader of Kazakhstan was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee party. And that's the only reason it was convenient to start this work from Uzbekistan.

In February 1983, by order of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, a commission headed by Telman Gdlyan and Nikolai Ivanov was created to check the use of water in irrigating cotton fields. They started working on April 25, 1983. These checks were called the "cotton case." However, on October 31, 1983, Sh.R. Rashidov died suddenly. This situation in Uzbekistan at that time in 1988-1990. Doctor of Law, Professor Alexander Sukharev, who worked as the chief prosecutor of the USSR, describes it this way: "A decree came from the center to increase cotton production. Therefore, in order to increase cotton yields, irrigation was increased in the fields under the responsibility of Sh. Rashidov. Then, as it became known, it was a lie." production was artificially inflated, the addition ranged from 0.5 million tons to 3 million tons (in total, 3 million tons of raw cotton were collected). At the beginning of 1983, Andropov verbally reprimanded Sh. Rashidov. After that, a resolution was adopted to check the state of cotton growing, and the situation changed."

Over the course of four years (1978-1983), 780 cases of appropriation, development and bribery were identified and investigated, completed and brought to court, 4 thousand people, in particular, 600 managers were brought to criminal liability (in relation to 13,000 people, criminal cases were stopped). Among those sentenced were the former minister of the cotton ginning industry, his 5 deputies, heads of departments of ministries, heads of regional departments, high-ranking representatives of the government system - 2 former secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, 400 deputies of local councils, 8 deputies of the Supreme Council of the USSR and the republic, the former chairman of the

Republican Council of Ministers , 6 generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1987, in the “Uzbek case”, the first deputy minister of internal affairs, son-in-law of L.I. Brezhnev, Yuri Churbanov, was arrested on suspicion of corruption.” [4,p.65].

At this time, little money was paid for cotton exported from the fields of Uzbekistan. For below average grades they paid 260 rubles, and for the highest grade - 600-700 rubles. And the most interesting thing is that prices were set by the center.

Of course, since the time of stagnation began in the USSR, the socialist system was disintegrating from within, corruption in all republics, in particular among the top leadership, was widespread. The investigators from the USSR Prosecutor General who came to Uzbekistan were also dishonest.

The great and famous publicist Sergei Plekhanov wrote: “The powers that Gdlyan received horrified the whole of Uzbekistan. He really was a dictator; one call or written order from him could remove any person from the party and deprive him of his position. Gdlyan’s team and his close associates, who lived in the apartments of the Shelkovichnaya Central Committee hotel, according to Gdlyan himself, were turned into the “Personnel Department of Uzbekistan.” A man unguided by anyone decided the fate of officials and powerful people. Today, O. Tchaikovskaya, who owns a huge amount of information, writes on the pages of Literaturnaya Gazeta (05.24.89): “Social consciousness was quite well, diligently (it is not clear on whose initiative, efforts) it was directed along one single path: a fighter was created, who entered the fight against corruption one-on-one for social justice. People believed, and this is understandable: they knew about corruption, the failure of the economy, empty shelves in stores, poverty; It seemed to them so: now a fearless man had appeared, and everyone relied on him. They knew what corruption was, but did not know who Gdlyan was. I can't blame them for this: to deceive them, some people did something. I don't understand who organized the patronage of unlimited power on the territory of the country” [5,p.32].

Continuing his thought, S. Plekhanov again writes his conclusion: “I confirm once again that our heroes were formed in Stalin’s school. To avoid slander, there is no need to declare them apostates. I feel sorry for Gdlyan and Ivanov, because they are small pebbles washed ashore by the waves of the sea, they are a product of an inhumane system. They are slaves captured by the sea, unable to go beyond its instructions. Gdlyan and Ivanov, as former jurists for a long time, knew that every suspect under investigation out of self-defense would share his crimes committed with high-ranking officials, thinking that they would help him get out of here. I don't believe that the people they accused are criminals.” [6, p.50].

About the machinations of Gdlyan and Ivanov, A. Sukharev writes: “At that time I was Rekunkov’s deputy (chief prosecutor of the USSR - author’s note), after some time I took his position. In my new position, naturally, I became interested in the “Uzbek business.” I thought that Gdlyan and Ivanov were on the right path. I began to get acquainted with the case after the number of investigative groups exceeded 200, and the number of prisoners amounted to several hundred. I learned that they used illegal investigative methods. After that, I decided to intervene in this matter. Especially after people I personally knew were accused of corruption, I stopped believing them.”

At the 19th Party Conference of the CPSU, Gdlyan, accusing the editor-in-chief of the Ogonyok magazine V. Korotich and some of the delegates of the special conference of corruption, after

declaring that there were patrons of Uzbek bribe-takers in Moscow and the Kremlin, the “Uzbek affair” grew into the “Kremlin affair.” Having no relation to these arguments of Gdlyan and Ivanov with justice and legality, this became open demogogy and influence and persecution by the authorities. After I was convinced of the arbitrariness of the investigators, using the power given to me, I decided to stop bullying people. I reprimanded Gdlyan and Ivanov for violating the law. Having a presentiment in advance that they must answer before the law for their actions, they, having been elected as deputies at a deputy meeting, took advantage of parliamentary immunity, and escaped punishment.” [7, p.72].

Drawing a conclusion, we can analyze that with the coming to power of the head of the State Security Committee (KGB) and the classical sculptor Yu.V. Andropov, a wave of repression began in some former Soviet republics, including Uzbekistan, of course, this was the last attempt of the center , extend your life. The “cotton affair” was only a tool of the Center to frighten the people and suppress the signs of national revival that had begun in them.

No matter how frightening the scale of the repressive policy of the CPSU in Uzbekistan was, it failed. After the “stagnation” during the period of “perestroika” (almost 2-3 years later), the Uzbek nation was reborn as a nation in order to protect itself. The repressive policy of the CPSU created the basis for independence, since this policy was not based on the spiritual and universal values of the Uzbek people. Eventually, there was a national awakening that was able to bring about democratic change.

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