IDEOLOGIES OF BELONGING AND IDENTITY AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FORMATION OF IRAQI AUTHORITY

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ABSTRACT

In Iraq, cultural and intellectual diversities exacerbate the disparity between Iraqi sects, as this intellectual and cultural gap has been developing for years. The Iraqi government can develop a justified policy and ideology of exclusion and fragmentation of identity according to the interests of the authority, exploiting this gap and its conflicts. This closed ideology contains rules and ideas that lead to the denial of reality and the elimination of the different sects. It is difficult to isolate this phenomenon from the ideological, cultural, political, social and religious conflicts within the state. This case depicts that the ideological violence practiced in Iraq historically was based on what we called the "dynamic doctrine," inherited in the social and political subconscious, and was also supported by factors of religious, political, and social upbringing. This justifies physical political violence. It is preceded by ideological processes practiced by elements of the moral state to achieve equality and freedom - from a governmental standpoint - between sects and to reach unity through mixing. This formed an Iraq with divided and warring identities according to complex details that combined religious, political, social and cultural memory. Thus, societal dynamics became driven by subjective factors and past psychological motives. This appeared through the conflict of representative memory in post-2003 Iraq, under the pretext of entitlement, and from here the Iraqi memory was divided. To an unjust and oppressed memory; That is, the exchange of roles between the two memories, which means that there is a defect in the warring and intertwined pluralistic systems that prevent the transformation from an entity to a political entity, meaning that there is a fear of future tyranny. Therefore, the democratic transformation in post-2003 Iraq requires rebuilding the artificial memory according to methodologies and concepts based on common interests.

Keywords: identity, Iraqi authority, inherited memory, cognitive gap, belonging ideology

INTRODUCTION

The concept of national identity in Iraq could only be built on a unilateral ideological vision, and it was reduced to a dominant Arab version in the course of successive political regimes, which reflected a direct and clear defect in the Iraqi national identity. In other words, the Arab nationalist discourse in a multinational country created a defect in the understanding of what constitutes intellectual and psychological affiliation to Iraq. Also, bragging about the history of Arab leaders increased the absence of Iraqi identity and highlighted a sub-identity at the expense of other identities due to the dominance of the Arab discourse of the ruling class. Thus, adding an Arab sub-identity within the pre-2003 regimes revealed ethnic, religious, and national sub-identities in what came after them. These identities, if not warring and intersecting materially, are warring and intersecting symbolically, politically, socially, and ideologically. Consequently, these identities have become an intellectual obstacle that hinders

the possibility of achieving meaning. Comprehensive of the Iraqi national identity.. Hence, the Iraqi national identity and the distortion it was subjected to as a result of the practices of successive political regimes in Iraq, made it surrender to the reality of canceling (itself) and assuming other selves imposed on it within the field of forcible transformation, and thus the Iraqi national identity did not stem from The individuals themselves automatically, but through what was practiced by the state and its elites framed by an Arab nationalist ideology that practiced the processes of assimilation and forced integration of all components of Iraqi society, regardless of its ethnic, religious, and sectarian spectrum.

Under the influence of the historical legacy of exclusion in Iraq, the political and even social scene came into conflict after 2003. Two memories are the Shiite memory and the Kurdish memory. These two memories derive their perceptions from their new representation within the authority, and each of them is still governed by the same logic, the logic of the right to sovereignty over Everything else, and deepening the feeling of exclusion, oppression, and the legitimate right to rule.

A mono-Arab narrative

In the beginning, what is meant by the mono-Arabic narrative; The Arab (nationalist) ideological currents before and after 2003, which were adopted by most of the successive politicians ruling Iraq, and which emphasized the historical glories of Arab and Islamic rule; By making nationalist/Arabist ideology a measure of national belonging and a basis for the identity of the Iraqi state (researcher).

Iraq, since the establishment of the state in it, has - according to what Batatu points out in his writing on Iraq - been built on the basis of a national identity with national (Arab) standards, and with a self-will that was embodied by a specific elite, the ruling elite at the time, if not a specific person in particular. Al-Tash'id ranged in its awareness of the new ideological concept from reaching Iraqi nationalism and Arab nationalism (Hanna Batatu, 1995: 45,55). Which, in the end, produced a new type of Arabism or Arab nationalism between the political class and society, by stoking the idea of the existence of a single Arab people who constitute Iraq, which coincided with the idea that the Iraqis of the twentieth century are the direct descendants of the inhabitants of Mesopotamia and the ancient Babylonians, and these two were expressed The two intellectual currents: Arab nationalism and Iraqi patriotism in school textbooks, which led to the beginning of a new feeling or awareness of nationalism/patriotism, and gradually this feeling developed into a doctrinal feature, and this (nationalist) content has undergone qualitative changes with the passage of time according to the reference and inclination of the supporters of this idea. The Nationalist (Marion Farouk Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, 2003: 43,44).

In fact, the ideological practices in Iraq, the most important of which are totalitarian practices, including nationalism/Arabism, did not succeed in building a stable and permanent state as much as they succeeded in building a state whose main concern is to dissolve the pluralistic structure of society, in preparation for building a major national federal state that brings together the Arab countries to achieve unity, according to The ideologies of political systems and nationalist parties claim to exist (Ali Abbas Murad, 2011: 85). What clearly contradicts this happened in post-2003 Iraq, which is the stage when Iraq entered what is described digressively as (a conflict of identities). Hence, the violence in Iraq is a direct result of the clash of ethnic-

nationalist (Arab)-religious identities, which produced a contradictory form. Between two national identities, Arab and Iraqi.

At the outset, it can be noted that the constitution is the legal determinant of national identity, and after a difficult struggle, it was approved in a referendum on October 15, 2005, declaring a state of ambiguity and lack of clarity in defining national identity, starting with the preamble and ending with the legal articles (Rashid Amara Yasser Al-Zaidi, 2006: 68,69), so doubts about the Arabness of Iraq appeared through its preamble and articles, as the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 stipulated in Article (3): Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities..., and Article (4), the first paragraph, indicated that: The Arabic language and the Kurdish language They are the two official languages of the state. For the first time, it was overlooked that it is part of the "Arab nation" as previous constitutions described it, except for the reminder that it is a founding and effective member of the League of Arab States, although the glow of Arab nationalism in addition to Kurdish nationalism seemed to be diminishing. The problems resulting from the multi-national character of the Iraqi state are still mostly the same, and the reason is that bilateral or multi-national states tend to define themselves through one of their dominant ethnic or national groups, and in Iraq the state is defined as Arab, despite its multiple diversity. Cultures and ethnicities. Successive Iraqi constitutions maintained the idea of Iraq being an Arab state until the 2005 constitution, which did not describe for the first time that it was part of the Arab world. However, all three other prime ministers - Iyad Allawi, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, and Nouri Al-Maliki - repeatedly expressed the idea The Arab identity of Iraq, stressing that there is no compromise on it (Shirko Karmanj, 2015: 331,332; Constitution of Iraq of 2005). This caused a huge uproar about the "Arabism of Iraq" at the internal and external levels. Here, sociologist Faleh Abdul-Jabbar says: The excessive focus on the item "Iraq's Arabness" involves a historically inherited emotional-ideological adherence adopted by moderate and extremist secular and Islamic trends (Faleh Abdul-Jabbar, 2005, 65).

This was reflected in the 2005 elections, when three governorates refused to act in light of what was stated in the constitution, which expressed the continued divisive nature of Iraqi society on national, ethnic and sectarian lines. This division was evident in the method of the electoral vote that took place in January and December. The first was in 2005, as well as in the referendum of August 2005, where the Arabists (Sunnis) boycotted these elections (Shirko Karamanj, 274, 275). Their boycott of the elections during that period also led to a reduction in their political influence in Iraq, and we point out that the Arab culture (Sunni nationalism) after 2003 appeared strongly in the media and statements, and Sunni politicians sought to build a political process on ideological nationalist foundations after 2003, based on Similar to the building of the Iraqi state in 1921 (Mohammed Sadiq Al-Hashemi, 2013: 32).

In this regard, Rashid Al-Khayoun says that the former Iraqi state was referred to as falling into the trap of sectarian discrimination and Arab nationalist tendencies, and this is an undeniable fact, but the fall of that state and the holding of elections ended that stage, and any talk about sectarian rights became outside constitutional life. In order to perpetuate sectarian behavior, despite the existence of a national and sectarian reality that cannot be overcome in Iraq, the danger is not in diversity, but in isolation within high walls and competition for parliamentary seats and power on a sectarian and nationalist basis, not on the basis of the national program (Rashid Al-Khayoun, 2011, 2, 274, 275).

Returning to the period of the fifties, and examining what the political maps were intended to be, it was considered a Middle Eastern stage par excellence, as global colonial policies attempted to neutralize the national emergence in the region by trying to link Iraq to the Baghdad Pact.. As for the seventies; The foreign policies of the major powers worked on two levels: first, engaging Iraq in an internal war of attrition in the north with the Kurds. The second: repositioning the concept of Shiite sectarian loyalty within Iraq from a regional perspective, through its confrontational relationship with Iran (Abdul-Ilah Belqziz, 2004), 121, 122). Which reflected a confrontational, Arab nature of a sectarian nature.

Hence, we find that forgetting the comprehensive national identity led to encouragement of regional and international interventions and acceptance of a political process based on national and sectarian quotas. The establishment of consensual democracy also had adverse results on the political, economic and social reality, and largely targeted the three-component theory, which robbed Iraq of its Arab identity. In a simple, automatic and intelligent way.

The Iraqi local elites' dealings with the new phenomenon also contributed to the politicization of the issue of identity in general. A state of confusion prevailed in the political discourse between supporters of Islamic identity, supporters of Arab nationalism, advocates of the concept of the Iraqi nation, and those demanding the preservation of Kurdish identity. That individual situation Iraqis to return to their primary loyalties (Ahmed Abdel Hafez Fawaz, 143).

By referring to the historically inherited memory, and specifically to the issue of the lack of agreement between the various Iraqi groups on a common national history; It is noted that the Arabists emphasize the Arab era and disparage the previous eras, while the Shiites see the Arab-Islamic era as having brought them nothing but grievances and calamities, while the Sunnis practice their sectarianism with a racist Arab mentality that stigmatizes the majority of the people of Iraq with foreignness, populism, and sectarianism, while the Kurdish nationalists close themselves to fanaticism and hostility. Nationalism and the almost complete regional Kurdization of the Iraqi part... All these divisions regarding the historical past between the various Iraqi groups constitute the decisive factor in weakening the national identity and dividing the Iraqis socially and politically according to ideological and spiritual prescriptions (Salam Kobaa Al-Otaibi, 22-24).

Based on this, it can be said that Arabism in Iraq is nothing but a sectarian intellectual conflict on the one hand, and a religious and secular ideological opposition on the other hand, which is intended to arrogate and exclude the other. That is, they are intellectual inheritances with personal political, social and religious interests.

Post-Arabism Narrative

Arab thought has produced a deficit or cognitive poverty regarding its understanding of democracy and political and social integration by adopting a project that carries a content of belonging to a coercive historical legacy, and thus contributed to the formation of beliefs and behaviors that are incapable of intellectual communication, and thus the formation of cultures that cannot recognize the different other by bringing in a democratic model. From outside the local cultural system, because democracy; A comprehensive societal process that is transformative and radically constructive at the same time. What is meant here is comprehensive societal change to bring about gradual, profound transformations in the political, economic, social and cultural structure, leading to overcoming alienation in light of

participation, and moving societal thought to move from the stage of historical emotion to the stage of peaceful integration, that is, it is It requires achieving consensus between different groups and discordant interests for the common good (Abdul Wahab Hamid Rasheed, 2006: 134, 135). This is evident after 2003 through the arrival of the political elite, haunted by a history of oppression and expulsion, to dissolve and take over the political sphere in order to settle its historical scores. Therefore, violence and terrorism were resorted to at the social and political levels. Political developments confirmed that voting in the elections took place on the basis of sectarian identities. Competing for power, and not on the basis of political programs or polarizations of a partisan ideological nature, for example, and as a result of these clashes, thousands of Iraqis were killed on sectarian grounds, and thus the Iraqi map was drawn on a new sectarian and ethnic basis (Shirko Karamanj, 270, 272).

It is worth noting here that the process of democratic transformation requires the availability of democratic intellectual elites who have a strong and effective influence in the popular political arena and thus have their influence in shaping the structures of the collapsed state... elites who represent democratic thought from the standpoint of accepting or rejecting work on it within an intellectual dialogue framework (disputation). (and arguments) between the authority and the opposition within the framework of cumulative political action, where democracy is manifested as a system of government, as a means of resolving conflicts, as a method of exchanging opinions, and as a method of reaching an agreement on compromise and approaches (Firas Al-Bayati, 2013: 155). The elections - and what happened in their aftermath - resulted in difficulty in organizing the emerging political blocs divided along ethnic and sectarian lines, and the difficulty was revealed in their ability to form a government. It reflected a state of fragility inherent in the Iraqi social and political system. These blocs not only suffered from intellectual rifts on the internal level, but also lacked internal cohesion between them as well (Shirko Karamanj, 281, 282).

Thus, democracy in post-2003 Iraq was established as a reaction to the ideology of pre-2003 Iraq, and built its structure on the ruins of a political ideological entity that prevailed and ruled and collapsed and disintegrated as a result of a totalitarian, tyrannical legacy. Iraq was divided politically and socially into three directions (Montaser Al-Eidani, 2012: 199, 200).

1-   A political-social trend, called the "Axis of the Winners": This trend seeks to eliminate injustice and restore rights that were historically stolen from it, and it consists of the forces of Shiite political Islam and the Kurdish forces in addition to some Sunni forces.

2-   A socio-political trend, called the "Axis of Losers", which sought to restore the previous positions of power and influence, and consisted of radical Sunni Islamic forces, a group of military personnel, Baathists, and some nationalists.

3-   A political-social trend called the "Axis of Moderation," which is a smaller trend that included liberal, leftist, and nationalist movements from the previous opposition abroad and forces at home with secular tendencies.

Here, Khazal Al-Majidi says: Three radical partisan fundamentalisms played a role in Iraq in politically directing its societal fabric. They are (international, national, and religious), and the revolutionary parties affiliated with them (communism, Baathism, and political Islam parties) played a major role in determining the view of the different other and in their uniqueness in the ability to lead society, and in stoking behaviors of conflict and opposition, but the nationalist

trend is represented by a party The Baath "was the most violent and ferocious in that, because it implemented its radical ideas through the authority in which it remained for more than 35 years" (Khazal Al-Majidi, 2014: 102).

Thus, the culture that rejects the other, and seeks to confiscate his right to exist, portends the existence of a system that represents a one-sided opinion, one culture, one race or sect, and one clan, which has made the relationship between the Iraqi cultural components a conflictual relationship, meaning that it results from a lack of mutual trust, and the endeavor of each... Including achieving regional or factional reconciliation at the expense of the public interest (Firas Al-Bayati, 258). Political life in Iraq under the American occupation became mixed with ambiguous security conditions, leading to the weakening of social structures due to the escalation of ethnic and sectarian differences. Thus, the Iraqi arena was filled with many political parties and movements, and thus it became one of the obstacles to transformation in Iraq and the dispersion of loyalty in it (Jassem Younis Al-Hariri, 2004: 637_639).

Here, Muhammad Atwan describes the rigid political doctrine of the Iraqi parties and movements, which takes its form in the ideological belief of individuals who believe in a certain form of the institutional political system and governance that is supposed to be implemented, and which matches the values and perceptions of the partisan group. Through the activity of the blocs and parties, we notice that streams of them adopt A religious doctrine that is believed to have come from heaven. On the other hand, parties emerge that believe in historical theories that represent a product of the human mind and call for social justice. Political socialization or party fatigue plays a role in matters of mobilization and in what is determined by the group's ideological belief. Then awareness of isolation grows. And absence and oppression, and ideology appears effective when moving from organic work within the framework of the political party to propaganda and mobilization among the masses (Mohamed Atwan, 2010: 144,147).

What fuels the violence between the cultural, social and religious components is their sense of the inevitability of identity and the claim to its uniqueness. This feeling would divide society in a way that would increase the state of violent conflict between identities that they believe are unique and inevitable. Therefore, the most exciting types of ideological violence are those linked to religious, ethnic and national identities. (Salah Al-Jabri, 2003: 59). Thus, it becomes impossible for opposing ideologies to achieve integration at the political and social levels.

Meroism is post-Arabism. Cognitive behavior based on dissonance, as Festinger (1957) calls it, explains the duality of the political personality, which is burdened by an inherited authoritarian stereotypical culture, and which always seeks consistency and solidarity in its perceptions, or the possibility of reducing the severity of the resulting dissonance, but nevertheless practices democracy and its pluralistic culture as behavior that is inconsistent with its beliefs (Salah Al-Jabri, 2013: 44,45). We refer to behavior that is inconsistent with one's direction as behavior opposite to the direction, and it produces dissonance if actions are perceived as freely chosen actions, and not coerced into them. Dissonance is extreme when it threatens self-harmony or produces negative results in the future.

Arab nationalist thought has ruled throughout modern Iraqi history, almost alone, which made it rooted in social and political behaviors on the one hand, crystallizing barriers or intellectual dissonances between the components that affected the issue of belonging to the homeland, and on the other hand, especially under the umbrella of distorted ideology and systems.

Institutional with a police nature, all of this created an obstacle in the social and political system.

Concept of sub-identities

The political, social, and economic accumulation in the Iraqi historical reality has torn apart the national identity, and emerged in its place, national, ethnic, religious, sectarian, tribal, and regional sub-identities... and these identities envisioned the reality of post-2003 Iraq, with the mentality of pre-2003 Iraq, that is, its conception of the forms and patterns of political violence used. The same, under the pretext of entitlement and majority based on historically inherited intellectual foundations, the quotas in governmental, administrative and functional positions; It is actually a conflict between competing identities (national identity, religious identity, and sectarian identity), as this competition led to a violation of the idea/concept of citizenship and the stoking of individual loyalty as an alternative to national loyalty.

Therefore, we understand why the occupation of Iraq did not only mean the overthrow of a political regime and the collapse of a security, institutional, economic, judicial and military system, but rather it meant lifting the lid on individual loyalties, which were constantly searching for their identities in the fragmentation of the national identity into separate fragments, that is; Strengthening its foundations at the expense of that historically forcefully unified identity. The voices of sectarian and national division and separation multiplied and escalated in the midst of the deterioration of the reality of Iraqi national identity.

This period was characterized by the conflict of the memory of sub-national and sectarian identities over state administration. The political culture of these sects and nationalities was built on historically inherited foundations, in addition to the new political system that worked to strengthen the concept of sub-identities. It deepened the Iraqi citizen's adherence to his own identity at the expense of citizenship identity, and its exclusive sanctity for them became superior to the sanctity of all identities.

What are sub-identities?

The social, cultural and ethnic components, their development and historical extensions in Iraq, have made them multiple ethnic, racial and sectarian groups... not fused in their identity representation at the level of political governance within the framework of the state. Here, it is not ideology that creates violent movements with a fanatical identity, but rather a group of factors. Historical materialism activates ideology and makes it an instigator and motivation for aggressive, exclusionary behavior. Sometimes the ideology does not have an aggressive, fanatical bias in its content, but its interpretation does. Here, the role of the institution that adopts and invests in the ideology (traditional and modern upbringing institutions) is highlighted, which seeks to achieve unrelated interests and goals. With that ideology... political and economic interests in its nature and reality (Saad Muhammad Rahim, 2015, 88). Therefore, the "identity crisis" stems from inherited intellectual challenges it faces, which causes each sub-group to attract feelings of loyalty to its sub-identity at the expense of national identity, which leads to an "identity crisis." It is a state of tension and emotional rupture, which fosters self-centeredness, leads to fanaticism and racial, religious, or sectarian discrimination, and reduces opportunities for tolerance, understanding, and dialogue. The reality is that the identity crisis in Iraq is, above all, a crisis of freedom, a crisis of awareness, and a crisis of understanding and dialogue with others. In other words, it is a crisis of citizenship that has not crystallized, a crisis

of an immature state, and a crisis of an exclusionary political system (Haifa Ahmed Muhammad, 10). This is if we want to ignore what Ali Al-Wardi mentioned in the glimpses about the existence of a sectarian identity conflict since the beginning of Islam. Meaning that it is rooted in social and religious thought historically (Ali Al-Wardi, 2005: 14, 15).

Therefore, the collective identity of any society; They are accumulations, structures, religions, sects, sects, and nationalities that are formed through a historical transition in which linguistic, social, ethnic, economic, and cultural elements and values are melted, through mutual recognition and partnership, while any in-depth reading of the history of modern Iraqi society discovers the fragility of the Iraqi identity and the failure to present the identity of religions, sects, sects, and groups. Linguistic society from which Iraqi society was formed is on the table for critical discussions. Therefore, this issue was placed in the field of taboos, which led to the transformation of these groups into closed sects, peoples, sects, and ethnicities, for which representations and stereotypical images of the "other" were created for them in an interchangeable manner, and contemptuous mythical compositions were also created that were given as teachings and rulings. Fixed through education and education and passed through religious jurisprudential narratives and cultural codes; Meaning that it is rooted through upbringing. In addition to political divisions and struggles over political power, they all played important roles in defaming or belittling the values and customs of other groups.

On the other hand, one can pay attention to the amount of knowledge that groups possess about others... that is, what the Shiite groups possess regarding Sunni groups, or regarding the Yazidi, Sabian, Syriac Christian, Assyrian, Kurdish, or each other groups, that is, it is a relationship characterized by aggression, racism, and self-distortion. It contains elements of political and religious conflict, and thus it is clear that the state of exclusion and non-acceptance of others is a fundamental feature of Iraqi society, fueled by multiple institutions, both traditional and modern.

What resulted in post-2003 Iraq was what we might call the fragmentation of national identity, crystallizing national, ethnic, religious, sectarian, tribal, and regional sub-identities. From this, we say that the demand for secession on national grounds was preceded by an increase in sectarian sentiment among the two main Sunni and Shiite sects, which... It resulted in a multiplicity of sectarian identity platforms, and was followed by quotas in government and administrative positions and jobs, which began to consolidate sub-identities at the expense of national identity (Hamid Al-Hashemi, 2015: 136). Hence, the sub-symbols took the approach of politicizing the sub-symbols in a maneuver aimed at exploiting the sub-capacity of policies regarding the basic differences in society, not to address and contain these differences, but rather to compete politically among them (Rashid Amara Yasser Al-Zaidi, 60).

After changing the political system in Iraq and forming a ruling council based on the inclusion of all sects, nationalities and religions through what is called consensual democracy, the latter contributed to the fragmentation of the comprehensive Iraqi national identity, since the new consensualism has a structure, polarization, and political discourse specific to a specific social segment and not another, and this is what It created a state of sectarian division and the absence of the national level of national identity, leaving it torn between multiple loyalties (Hassan Turki Omair, 2013, 158). The fragmentation of national identity and the loss of its essence did not remain limited to the Governing Council, as an internal factor, but rather it

extended to all aspects of institutional life in the nascent state. Perhaps the influence of the external factor on Iraqi national identity was not limited to the United States of America, as other regional and international countries were not lost. The opportunity to have its say in the process of drawing and defining the nature of the Iraqi national identity, especially after it was given the green light by the United States of America (Saadi Al-Ibrahim, 2014: 248, 249).

Because the sub-identities have regional extensions and external sectarian political representations, they took advantage of the weakness of the state due to the collapse and division of the politically inclusive identity, and thus it redefined its existence and confirmed its sub-identity presence on an ideological basis, and at the expense of the homeland and the common national identity (Haifa Ahmed Muhammad, 10, 11). Therefore, the division of identities, their contradiction, and their competition for power and hegemony are considered among the major obstacles facing the formation of a comprehensive Iraqi identity. These identities do not have a deep historical memory, and they cannot recognize the common destiny among them. The option of democracy and democratization alone is not sufficient to build a comprehensive Iraqi national identity (Sherko). Karamanj, 245).

Thus, sectarian practices were escalated at the level of the discourse of authority. Such behavior deepened national sectarian discrimination and tendencies of tyranny and terrorism, and was reflected in sectarian control over political life away from loyalty to the state and the law, which prompted the use of all methods (political violence, terrorism), which... It strengthened sectarian collective loyalty and made it an obstacle to national belonging (Nazim Nawaf Ibrahim, 2015: 103, 104).

These factors also formed a political class with exclusionary identities. In the sense of disagreeing with the other or excluding him, that is, it is an identity that enshrines the concept of superiority, and does not accept the other as much as it searches for a classification for him with the aim of limiting or marginalizing him, and it is a tool for hatred, not communication (Rashid Amara Yasser Al-Zaidi,, 52).

Based on this, the Iraqi identity was aroused through the ethnic, sectarian, sectarian, or nationalist mobilization of one or more groups, through policies of inclusion and exclusion, which generated a feeling of discrimination and persecution among members of the group against which the discrimination was practiced.

The nature of sub-identities

Iraqi society, as we mentioned previously, is characterized by societal pluralism (nationalities, ethnicities, and religions), which requires the existence of real harmony between these components. However, the political authorities and the approach of fragmentation and exclusion, in addition to historical intellectual disagreement, led to real social fragmentation that is not clear in form. But they are intrinsically rooted, and thus these factors have become structural holes in the fabric of national identity, which has produced in post-2003 Iraq a divided and fragmented identity along partisan, sectarian, national, religious, regional, and tribal foundations, as a historical product of previous stages of modern Iraqi history, and this is due to the absence of principles. Equality, weak citizenship, and lack of recognition of religious, ethnic, or linguistic cultural diversity are among the special considerations that often stand behind the emergence of special sub-identities, escaping the comprehensive general identity or the pressure of its negative use that may lead to fragmentation or atomization.

Perhaps this is what accompanied the changes. Which happened in Eastern Europe in a severe way, especially after years of suppression of freedoms, domination, lack of recognition of diversity and pluralism, in addition to central totalitarianism (Abdul Hussein Shaaban, 2015: 95). After the collapse of the regular institutional structure shortly after the American occupation of Iraq, the formal, historically eroded national identity was lost, due to the formation of an Iraqi government on the basis of sectarian, national, and religious quotas, which helped disintegrate the national identity and analyze it into sub-identities with conflicting intellectual heritage (Rasul Mutlaq Muhammad, 2012: 138,139).

Hence, Ibrahim Al-Haidari says: The multiplicity of tribal and sectarian affiliations derives its existence from sub-identities, and appears in groups with traditional culture, patriarchal (patriarchal) tendencies, and tribal values and fanaticism, where loyalty to the tribe or sect is stronger and stronger than loyalty to the state and homeland, and for this reason pride in the tribe is transformed. To "tribalism" and pride in sect to "sectarianism", and this indicates the weakness of organic social integration into society and the inability of different groups to unite in a single national identity that constitutes a definitional framework for the meaning of the neutral state, that is, the civil state that transcends colors into a comprehensive and shared identity meaning. Its goal is to achieve harmony, security, stability and peaceful coexistence among its components, so that the view of the other becomes, in the absence of this given, one-dimensional, and here lies its danger and the danger that threatens it as a result of raising the effectiveness of sub-identities and exaggerating them so that they turn into a state of fear, ambush and defense. And at the same time, there is an inability to meet others with understanding, communication, and dialogue (Ibrahim Al-Haidari, 2016).

Thus, the phenomenon of the division of Iraqi identities exploded, under the influence of two factors (internal and external), the first factor; It lies in the weakness of Islamic culture on the one hand, and the weakness of civil rights culture on the other hand, in addition to the historical intellectual legacy (religious and political)... As for the second factor; It lies in the submission of the political system in Iraq to external forces, following the occupation, the collapse of political authority and state institutions, and then its establishment again by external will with the formation of the Governing Council, which was a reflection of the Iraqi opposition (external and internal), as it was detailed according to the sectarian and national diversity in Iraq. That is, it fragmented the Iraqi identity, by dividing the council seats into three main components, which were considered the basis from which the new Iraqi state was composed, where the Shiites were represented by (13) members, the Sunnis were represented by (5) members, and the Kurds were represented by (5) members. While two seats were given to the Turkmen and the Christian, which increased the identity conflict in Iraq based on sectarian quotas that embodied the state of components at the expense of the state of citizenship, and this was adopted in the constitution and the political process (Saadi Al-Ibrahim 2014: 191,192). This process led to the consolidation of sectarian, regional, and component identities, which in turn constituted obstacles to the possibility of building the state, its institutions, and its security, political instability, and a high level of violence and the phenomenon of terrorism (Abdul Hussein Shaaban, 114, 117).

This indicates the continuation of dealing with Iraq's present and future, based on the fact that it is a Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish community, which is the basis on which the subsidiary

identities in Iraq were built, in contrast to the failure to achieve the foundations of national identity. It is also the reason for adopting the system of consensual democracy, and then applying the principle of quotas, which is what It led to division and conflict based on sectarian identity (Ali Abbas Murad, 93, 94).

On the other hand, the rise of the roles of sectarian and ethnic forces in the political process and the Iraqi political system after 2003 was associated with the weakness of the ability of the nationalist, leftist and liberal movements, and the decline of their roles in filling the vacuum that followed the situation before the change, and this rise enabled historical forces to re-establish themselves. And they began to try to regain their position as active parties, despite the weakness of their influence in creating a socio-political balance between the two large sects. This is often attributed to the regional factor, which is among the most prominent reasons that led to the formation of fanatical sectarian, national, and religious identities with political interests in which the regional factor plays a role. Essentially (Luqman Hakim Rahim, 2016: 55, 56).

Although the federal political system addresses ethnic and national pluralisms and resolves the Kurdish issue, thus allowing the building of a comprehensive national identity that transcends component divisions, this system has in fact produced a regional, social, and political division of a confrontational national character (Abdul Hakim Khusru Gozel, 2015: 224,225).). In the absence of harmony and common destiny as a mechanism for unification, we see it as natural for social groups to express their affiliation in a manner consistent with their national and religious identities that extend beyond borders. This explains the state of diaspora in sectarian and ethnic-national ties, which lies in the contradiction and paradox of "societies." Imagined" (Shirko Karamanj, 332).

Sectarian, national and religious conflict...; It is not an inherited condition transmitted through genes. Rather, it is a culture that a person derives from his early environment during childhood and adolescence, or even after that. That is, through upbringing institutions. It has its own climate in which it thrives and is transformed into social behavior, an intellectual stance, and a way of life.. In all cases, it is an exclusionary, fanatical identity that cannot be overcome except through deep intellectual stages, whose nourishment is reconsidered through the stages of upbringing as well (Saad Muhammad Rahim, 94, 96).).

Based on what was stated in this requirement; We can say that the Iraqi identity is based on the legacies of historical social and cultural schism, and that this schism is also justified ideologically, because Iraq is located, spatially, between two major geographical and political spheres, so that the dissident identities in it have geographical and regional extensions, which all contributed to the delineation of its borders. The ruling architecture that influences the nature of its religious, national and cultural subordination at the internal level... has turned into a product of cross-border religious, political and national discourses, within a systemic incubator intended to manage the conflict with a contemporary historical vision.

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